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The Chicago School's Foundation Is Flawed: 
Antitrust Protects Consumers, Not Efficiency 
John B. Kirkwood and Robert H. Lande 
One of the foundations of Chicago School antitrust policy is that the only 
permissible objective of antitrust law is to enhance economic efficiency.B3 
The centrality of this lodestar to the Chicago School was explained elo, 
quently by then-Professor Robert Bork: 
Antitrust policy cannot be made rational until we are able to give a 
firm answer to one question: What is the point of the law-what are its 
goals? Everything else follows from the answer we give .... Only when 
the issue of goals has been settled is it possible to frame a coherent 
body of substantive rules. B4 
Bark not only supplied the question; he also was the original supplier 
of its answer. He performed a "strict constructionist" analysis of the anti-
trust laws' legislative history in a famous and often-cited 1966 law review 
article. 55 Bark appeared to demonstrate how the legislative history of the 
Sherman Act established that when Congress debated and passed this law 
it had only one concern: increased economic efficiency.B6 As of this 
analysis he made an apparently convincing argument that, if the legisla-
tive debates were analyzed closely, the then-common "populist" views of 
antitrust, including the belief that the antitrust laws were to fur-
ther a variety of social and political goals, such as combating the political 
power of big business, or assisting small businesses, were not a concern of 
Congress.£7The efficiency conclusion is now Chicago School gospel. Indeed, 
Judge Richard Posner recently asserted that virtually everyone now agrees 
89 
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90 Is Efficiency All That Counts? 
that the antitrust laws have a single objective-maximizing economic 
efficiency.BB 
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that the Chicago School is 
wrong, as to both congressional intent and to recent case law. The primary 
goal of antitrust actually is to prevent "unfair" transfers of wealth from pur-
chasers to firms with market power. We submit that the antitrust laws on 
the books today best can be explained as a congressional declaration that 
the property right we term "consumers' surplus"B9 belongs to consumers,?o 
not to cartels or to no one. The antitrust laws were enacted primarily to 
award this relatively amorphous property right to consumers, and to pre-
vent cartels and monopolies from taking it. Another way to express this 
is to note that tbe primary goal of the antitrust laws can be expressed in 
consumer protection terms?': these laws better define consumers' property 
rights and protect them from being stolen by firms with market power.72 
This chapter first will demonstrate that the wealth transfer concern is 
the primary reason for the passage of the antitrust laws and is a far more 
plausible explanation than the efficiency goal. Its next section will ana-
lyze the treatment of these issues in recent antitrust cases. It will show 
how these cases can be best explained in terms of a concern with wealth 
transfers, as opposed to a concern with efficiency. For these reasons, we 
conclude that the foundation of the Chicago School is flawed. and that the 
correct path of antitrust policy should not be determined by the view that 
increasing efficiency is more important than protecting consumers. 
I. The Legislative History 
Judge Bork argued that the original framers of the Sherman Act had a sin-
gle intent: to enhance economic efficiency. He argued that "the whole task 
of antitrust can be summed up as the effort to improve allocative efficiency 
without impairing productive efficiency so greatly as to produce either no 
or a net loss in consumer welfare."73 Bork explicitly rejected distrib-
utive issues as a possible area of congressional concern: "[Ilt seems clear 
the income distribution effects of economic activity should be completely 
excluded from the determination of the antitrust legality of the activity."74 
Bork pointed to dozens of statements revealing an overriding congres-
sional concern that cartels and certain other business forms would acquire 
the power to artificially raise prices and restrict output,75 Bark presented 
many statements of concern by Senator Sherman76 and other legislators77 
that some of the trusts and other businesses of the period had enough power 
to raise prices. Bork summarized this portion of the debates succinctly: 
"[t]he touchstone of illegality is raising prices to consumers. There were no 
exceptions."78 Since we know of no serious disagreement that this indeed 
was the preoccupation of the debates, we will not discuss it further. Bork 
then used modern economic analysis to explain how monopoly power 
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leading to higher prices for consumers can produce the form of economic 
inefficiency we today term allocative inefficiency.79 
Bork reasoned that since we now know that the "only" harm to "con-
sumer welfare" from higher prices is allocative inefficiency, congressional 
displeasure with market power can fairly be equated with a concern about 
allocative inefficiency. He then presented a smaller, although still signifi-
cant, number of quotations that showed a congressional desire to preserve 
and enhance corporate productive efficiency.ao On the basis of this evi-
dence, Bork concluded that the antitrust laws embody only a concern for 
"consumer welfare," which he equated with the "maximization of wealth 
or consumer want satisfaction"81 and the aggregate economic efficiency of 
our economy. 82 
The key question, however, is precisely why Congress objected when the 
trusts, cartels, and monopolies raised prices to consumers. As the diagram 
illustrates, these higher prices cause two direct types of economic effects: 
the transfer of surplus from consumers to cartels and monopolists, and 
allocative inefficiency. Which one was Congress's concern? Or were both a 
concern? 
Bork's efficiency conclusion cannot reasonably account for many impor-
tant statements from the Sherman Act's legislative history.83 For example, 
Senator Sherman termed the prices "extortion"84 and "extorted 
wealth.H85 One congressman referred to the overcharges as "robbery,"86 
and a complaint was made that the trusts "without rendering the slight-
est equivalent" have "stolen untold millions from the people."8? Another 
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congressman complained that the beef trust "robs the farmer on the one 
hand and the consumer on the other."e" Another declared that the trusts 
were "impoverishing" the people through "robbery."89 Senator Hoar 
declared that monopolistic pricing was "a transaction the direct purpose 
of which is to extort from the community ... wealth which ought to be gen-
erally diffused over the whole community."90 Another senator complained: 
"They aggregate to themselves great enormous wealth by extortion .... "91 
Do terms like "stealing," "robbery," "extortion," and "stolen wealth" 
sound like allocative inefficiency'r Is it not much more likely that Congress 
in effect awarded the property right we today call "consumers' surplus" to 
consumers, and under the antitrust laws, the taking of consumers' surplus 
by cartels constitutes theft?92 
To further contrast the efficiency and wealth transfer goals, consider 
why stealing is illegal. Why does make it illegal for people to reach 
their hands into other peoples' wallets and take their money? 
Stealing is inefficient. There is no doubt that if it were legal to steal, 
this would lead to inefficiency.93 But, do we condemn stealing because 
of its inefficiency effects? Is not the real reason we condemn stealing 
because it constitutes an "unfair" taking of property without consent and 
without compensation? Stealing is an unfair transfer of wealth, and this 
is the reason why stealing money out of someone's wallet is-and should 
be-illegal. 
Moreover, even though main complaint about trusts-
that they were perceived to raise prices to purchasers-cannot equate to 
a concern with allocative inefficiency, could Congress primarily have 
been concerned with corporate productive efficiency? Did Congress pass 
the Sherman Act primarily to help corporations save costs and otherwise 
increase corporate productive efficiency? 
While it is true the that enacted the antitrust laws did appre-
ciate corporate they nevertheless passed the antitrust laws 
that in so many ways attacked these highly efficient organizations.95 If all 
they had wanted to do was to encourage that form of industrial organiza-
tion that was then the most productively efficient, they would have 
the trusts, not condemned them in the legislative debates and enacted 
a law that condemned many of their activities. Congress must have been 
concerned with other goals. This leaves the wealth transfer explanation as 
being most consistent with the evidence. 
II. The Case Law 
In recent years, the case law has largely adopted the view that the ultimate 
goal of the antitrust laws is to protect consumers, not increase efficiency. 
While most decisions do not address the issue, those that do almost always 
indicate that the fundamental objective of antitrust is to improve the 
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welfare of consumers. When courts use the term "consumer welfare," more-
over, they do not appear to be referring to economic Ju dges rarely 
describe the goal of antitrust as enhancing efficiency and, more important, 
they never say that conduct that harms consumers in the relevant market 
is justified if it increases the efficiency of the economy. While it is possible 
that courts are using "consumer welfare" as Bork did, recent opinions pro-
vide little evidence ofthat. Instead, most judges seem to believe that the aim 
of antitrust is to prevent conduct that deprives consumers of the benefits of 
competition and transfers their wealth to firms with market power.96 
In section A, we provide an overview of the case law by explaining why 
most courts, even when they use the ambiguous term "consumer welfare," 
likely believe that the preeminent objective of the antitrust laws is to pro-
tect consumers, not enhance efficiency. Then we examine the cases them-
selves. In section B, we focus on recent Supreme Court and appellate court 
decisions that illuminate the ultimate purpose of the antitrust laws. In sec-
tion C, we look at the area where the courts have most often faced a conflict 
between protecting consumers and enhancing efficiency-merger cases. 
A. "Consumer Welfare" and the Welfare of Consumers 
The term "consumer welfare" is ambiguous because it could refer either to 
the welfare of consumers in the relevant market or to economic efficiency. 
This ambiguity arose because Bork equated "consumer welfare" with the 
efficiency of the economy,97 and the Supreme Court quoted Bark when it 
declared that the legislative. history ofthe Sherman Act suggests it is a "con-
sumer welfare prescription."Og As a result, when courts use "consumer wel-
fare" today, could be invoking Bork's concept, not the literal meaning 
of the term, and thus could be indicating that what they really care about is 
total welfare, not the welfare of consumers. For four reasons, however, we 
doubt this is SO.99 
First, some decisions clearly take the position that the ultimate objec-
tive of antitrust law is to benefit consumers, not increase efficiency. As we 
will see, in Brooke Group/GO the Supreme Court equated "consumer wel-
fare" with the welfare of consumers, not with total welfare, and accorded 
primacy to the former. 
Second, while most opinions are less clear, they appear to support a 
consumer-oriented view of antitrust law because they focus on consumer 
impact rather than efficiency. In assessing the conduct at issue, they 
expressly examine its effect on things that matter to consumers-such 
as price, quality, or choice-but they rarely examine its effect on total 
welfare. 
Third, in recent years, very few decisions state that any aspect of effi-
ciency is a goal of the antitrust laws and those that do refer only to alloca-
live efficiency. If these courts had been following Bork, they would have 
mentioned productive efficiency as wel1.101 Moreover, the decisions that 
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identify allocative efficiency as a goal always treat it as a correlate of con-
sumer impact, not an independent value.102 
Fourth, and most important, whenever the courts have addressed an 
actual or potential conflict between consumer well-being and efficiency, 
consumer interests have always prevailed. As section C illustrates, no 
recent decision has taken the position that an improvement in economic 
efficiency trumps an adverse impact on consumers. 
B. Decisions Illuminating the Ultimate Objective 
In contrast to Bork and Posner, antitrust decisions today rarely describe the 
ultimate goal of the antitrust laws as increasing efficiency. In recent years, 
however, many decisions have indicated that the purpose of the antitrust 
laws is to protect consumers or enhance consumer welfare.lo3 
1. Supreme Court 
In Brooke Group, the Court identified the "traditional concern" of the 
antitrust laws as "consumer welfare and price competition."104 The Court 
equated consumer welfare, moreover, not with economic efficiency but with 
the benefits received by consumers in the relevant market. In analyzing 
whether unsuccessful predatory pricing should be illegal, the Court noted 
that below-cost pricing could sometimes cause allocative inefficiency. It 
declared, however, that unsuccessful predatory pricing "produces lower 
aggregate prices in the market, and consumer welfare is enhanced."105 In 
measuring consumer welfare by the level of prices in the market rather than 
by allocative efficiency, the Court signaled that the ultimate aim of antitrust 
law is to enhance the well-being of consumers in the relevant market, not 
maximize economic efficiency or minimize inefficiency.lo6 Thus, the Court 
noted that unsuccessful predation is "in general a boon to consumers."107 
In Weyerhaeuser/DB a more recellt case challenging predatory bidding 
rather than predatory pricing, the Court repeatedly compared the effects 
of the two practices on consumers. In total, the Weyerhaeuser opinion con-
tains 12 references to consumer impact (e.g., "consumer welfare,"I09 "lower 
prices to consumers,"11O "consumer harm,"lll "effect on consumer prices"ll2). 
The opinion contains no references to economic efficiency. Although the 
Court ultimately adopted a test for predatory bidding that depends on the 
practice's effect on suppliers, not consumers, that is consistent with the leg-
islative history's concern with the transfer of wealth from innocent par-
ties (buyers or sellers) to firms with market power. Like the Congress that 
passed the Sherman Act, therefore, Weyerhaeuser focused on harm to these 
market participants, not to the efficiency of the economy. 
In Leegin,113 the Court stated that the rule of reason "distinguishes 
between restraints with anticompetitive effect that are harmful to the con-
sumer and restraints stimulating competition that are in the consumer's 
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best interest."114 In articulating a one-to-one correspondence between 
effects of competition and effects on consumers, the Court indicated that 
the lodestar of antitrust analysis is impact on consumers. Elsewhere, the 
Court did state that the per se rule against resale price maintenance could 
cause manufacturers to engage in "inefficient" practices,115 and it suggested 
that vertical price fixing was frequently "efficient."115 On the whole, how-
ever, the Court stressed the welfare of consumers. It repeatedly referred 
to matters of concern to consumers such as price levels, product quality, 
and options.ll7 It never mentioned "total welfare" or "total surplus," even in 
explaining why inefficient vertical practices were undesirable. On the con-
trary, the Court said that inefficient practices harmed "consumer welfare" 
because they forced consumers to pay higher prices.118 
2. Appellate Courts 
This same focus on the well-being of consumers rather than economic effi-
ciency is evident in recent appellate opinions. For example, the Seventh 
Circuit stated: "The principal purpose of the antitrust laws is to prevent 
overcharges to consumers,"119 The Sixth Circuit quoted a trial court's state-
ment that "the very purpose of antitrust law is to ensure that the benefits 
of competition flow to purchasers of goods affected by the violation,"12o 
Writing for the D.C. Circuit, Judge Ginsburg characterized a court deciding 
an antitrust case as a "court of consumer welfare,"121 and his opinion sug-
gests he meant the welfare of consumers, not economic efficiency. When he 
summarized the FTC's methodology for evaluating horizontal restraints, 
first announced in Mass. Board of Optometry,122 and explained why it was 
acceptable, he referred to impact on consumers eight times but never men-
tioned economic efficiency,123 Most important, when he described what a 
defendant must show under the Commission's methodology to justify a 
restraint, he did not use the metric of economic efficiency. He did not say 
that a restraint would be justified if it enhances productive efficiency more 
than it reduces allocative efficiency, or if it increases producers' surplus 
more than it diminishes consumers' surplus. Instead, a defendant must 
show that "the restraint in fact does not harm consumers or has 'procom-
petitive virtues' that outweigh its burden upon consumers,"124 
Many other appellate decisions have also indicated that the ultimate test 
of whether a practice violates the antitrust laws is its impact on consum-
ers. In Microsoft,125 the D.C. Circuit declared, "to be condemned as exclu-
sionary, a monopolist's act must have an 'anticompetitive effect: That is, it 
must harm the competitive process and thereby harm consumers.""26 Both 
the Eleventh Circuit and the Fourth Circuit have quoted this statement,127 
The Tenth Circuit stated, "to be judged anticompetitive, the [conduct] must 
actually or potentially harm consumers:'"28 Writing for the Seventh Circuit, 
Judge Easterbrook echoed the thesis of this article when he declared: 
"Calling the selection of components for one's product a 'tie-in' does not 
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help to uncover practices that restrict output, drive up prices, and transfer 
wealth from consumers to producers."129 
C. Merger Cases: Increased Efficiency Never Excuses Harm 
to Consumers 
In merger cases, courts have frequently faced an actual or potential conflict 
between economic efficiency and the welfare of consumers.130 If a merger is 
likely to generate both cost savings and greater market power, the increase 
in productive efficiency could easily outweigh the loss in allocative effi-
ciency, causing a net gain in overall efficiency, even though consumers in 
the relevant market are hurt because they have to pay higher prices.131 No 
U.S. court, however, has ever allowed a merger that was likely to increase 
prices in the relevant market (or otherwise diminish consumer choice) 
because it would enhance economic efficiency. To the contrary, the courts 
have uniformly insisted that merging parties cannot establish an efficien-
cies defense unless they show both that the merger would generate signif-
icant cost savings and that enough of those savings would be passed on to 
consumers that consumers would benefit from (or at least not be hurt by) 
the merger. 
In Heinz,132 for example, the nc. Circuit stated that a "defendant who 
seeks to overcome a presumption that a proposed acquisition would sub-
stantially lessen competition must demonstrate that the intended acqui-
sition would result in significant economies and that these economies 
ultimately would benefit competition and, hence, consumers."133 In Swedish 
Match,134 Judge Hogan held that the defendants' efficiency evidence was 
insufficient to overcome the presumption of illegality because the defen-
dants had not shown what proportion of their cost savings they would pass 
on and "how that will defeat the likely price increases in this market."135 
Both of these decisions stand for the proposition that "an acquisition that 
lowers costs may still be unlawful 'if it results in an increased likelihood 
of higher prices.' "136 Other cases concur,137 and there is no decision to the 
contrary. The merger cases to date, therefore, have uniformly applied a con-
sumer impact standard, rather than a total welfare standard, to the evalua-
tion of claimed efficienciesPs 
In some of these cases, moreover, this position was not simply dictum. 
The court found actual merger-specific efficiencies but disregarded some or 
all of them because they were unlikely to benefit consumers. In Stapies,139 
for example, the defendants asserted that the challenged transaction would 
produce a variety of efficiencies, including better prices from vendors and 
reduced distribution costS.140 Although Judge Hogan identified numerous 
problems with this defense, he did not conclude that the merger would gen-
erate no significant cost savings. To the contrary, he stated that "the Court 
believes that there would be some efficiencies realized by the merger." 141 He 
ruled that these savings did not excuse the transaction, however, because 
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most of them would not be passed on,142 and thus consumers in the relevant 
markets would likely pay higher rather than lower prices after the merger.143 
Conclusion 
The normative foundation of Chicago School antitrust policy is flawed. 
Both the legislative history of the antitrust laws and recent case law indi-
cate that the fundamental goal of antitrust enforcement is not increasing 
economic efficiency. It is protecting consumers in the relevant market from 
practices that deprive them of the benefits of competition and transfer their 
wealth to firms with market power. 
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